Abstract-In this paper, the problem of simultaneously generating multiple keys over a cascade of a noiseless channel and a wiretap channel is considered. The problem consists of three legitimate parties (i.e., Alice, Bob, and Carol) and an eavesdropper (Eve), where Alice and Bob wish to agree with Carol on independent secret keys, both of which should be kept secret from Eve. Alice and Bob are connected via a noiseless channel, and Bob is connected with Carol via a wiretap channel, while there is no direct connection between Alice and Carol. To Alice and Carol, Bob acts as a relay. Under this model, a full characterization of the secret-key capacity region is provided for the case in which Eve has no side information. This result shows that there exists a tradeoff between the individual secret-key rates. Then, this result is generalized to the case in which Eve has side information, and the corresponding secret-key capacity region is fully characterized.
On Simultaneously Generating Multiple Keys in a Joint Source-Channel Model and the channel connected to an eavesdropper to generate a secret key [13] [14] [15] [16] . This problem is typically approached either from a source or a channel perspective, but Khisti et al. recently introduced a new joint source-channel model for the problem of key generation [17] . Under this model, the authors provided upper and lower bounds on the key capacity. Furthermore, [17] also contains a full characterization of the key capacity when certain Markov chain conditions are satisfied.
One important assumption in the existing works is that the public discussion is directly available to all legitimate users. While it is important to assume that the public discussion is available to the eavesdropper (so that the generated key is secure in the worst case scenario), there are some practical scenarios in which the public discussion is directly received only by a subset of the legitimate users. For example, in key generation over wireless networks [18] , public discussion messages are transmitted over wireless channels. Hence, it is reasonable to assume that public discussion messages are directly received only by neighboring legitimate users. In this case, the assumption that the public discussion is directly available to all legitimate users can be overly optimistic.
To gain some understanding of scenarios with limited direct access to the public discussion by certain legitimate users, we consider an extension of the joint source-channel model of [17] . In our model, there are three legitimate users: Alice, Bob, and Carol. Alice and Bob are connected by a noiseless public channel (the eavesdropper, Eve, can observe this noiseless channel), and Bob is connected with Carol via a noisy channel (Eve can also eavesdrop on this channel). However, Alice has no direct connection with Carol and therefore Carol does not have direct access to the public discussion messages sent by Alice. This network setting captures many relevant scenarios such as the scenario in which Alice is a server that connects with the base station Bob over an optical fiber, which can be viewed as noiseless, and Carol is a wireless user. secure from Alice and Eve. We first consider a case in which Eve has no side information, and fully characterize the secretkey capacity region. Then, we generalize the considered model to the case in which Eve has side information, and obtain a full characterization of the corresponding capacity region as well. It turns out that if we only care about the key between Alice and Carol, the considered model can be simplified to the source model with one-way limited-rate public discussion as studied in [10] , and we show that our result recovers the result in [10] . On the other hand, if we only care about the key between Bob and Carol, the model can be viewed as a wiretap channel [15] and our result recovers that of the wiretap channel. Furthermore, there is a trade-off between the two cases so that Alice and Bob cannot attain their maximal secret-key rates simultaneously.
In addition to the work mentioned above, our work is related to recent papers on simultaneously generating multiple keys in networks consisting of trusted and untrusted parties [19] [20] [21] [22] [23] . The main differences between our model and models in these papers are: 1) we consider a joint source-channel model; and 2) we assume that the public discussion is not directly available to all users.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The system model and the problem setup are introduced in Section II. In Section III, we state our main results and provide a corresponding discussion. Finally, we offer our concluding remarks in Section IV.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM STATEMENT As illustrated in Fig. 1 , we consider a scenario in which Alice and Carol wish to agree on a secret key K 1 taking values from K 1 , while Bob wishes to agree with Carol on a secret key K 2 taking values from K 2 . Under this model, K 1 is required to be kept confidential from Bob and Eve, while K 2 is required to be kept confidential from Alice and Eve.
Unlike Bob who can communicate with Carol over a noisy channel eavesdropped upon by Eve, Alice has no direct connection with Carol and therefore she needs assistance from Bob. The link between Bob and Carol is modeled as a wiretap channel (X , P Y Z|X , Y, Z), where X , Y and Z denote finite channel input and output alphabets. Thus, X n , a sequence encoded by Bob, is the input to the wiretap channel while Y n and Z n are the corresponding outputs, where n is the sequence length. Alice and Bob can communicate through a noiseless link. However, any message exchanged over this noiseless link will also be perfectly overheard by Eve.
Alice, Carol and Eve are assumed to have access to three correlated random sequences U N , V N and W N , N ∈ N, which are generated independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) according to a distribution P U V W . And U, V and W take values from the finite alphabets U, V and W, respectively. Here and hereafter, N is the length of the source sequences, which can be different from n.
Definition 1: An (N, n) key-agreement protocol for the joint source-channel model is as follows.
• Step 0 
) and f i−1 is defined in a similar manner.
• Step k). (After Alice and Bob finish their discussion)
Denote 
Here, the use of RVs F 0 and F 0 enables the messages exchanged over the public noiseless channel to be random functions of U N , while F b ensures that Bob can use stochastic coding to generate his own key with Carol.
Definition 2: A secret-key rate pair (R 1 , R 2 ) is said to be achievable if ∀ > 0 there exists an n( ) ∈ N and a sequence of (N, n) codes such that ∀n ≥ n( ), we have
Here, (1) indicates that the keys generated at the key generating parties should be the same with high probability, (2) means that K 1 is required to be secure from Bob, (3) means that K 2 should be secure from Alice, (4) implies that (K 1 , K 2 ) should be jointly secure from Eve, (5) indicates that the generated keys should be nearly uniformly distributed, and (6) indicates that R 1 and R 2 are the key rates of K 1 and K 2 , respectively.
Definition 3: The secret-key capacity region C is defined as
Furthermore, we use C 1 to denote the maximal value of R 1 (i.e., the key capacity of K 1 ), C 2 to denote the maximal value of R 2 (i.e., the key capacity of K 2 ) and C sum to denote the maximal value of R 1 + R 2 (i.e., the sum capacity of (K 1 , K 2 )).
Notation: Appendix A summarizes the notation used throughout the following sections.
III. MAIN RESULTS
In this section, to facilitate the presentation and understanding of our scheme, we first consider the special case in which Eve has no side information, i.e., the case where W = ∅, and denote the corresponding secret-key capacity region by C 0 . For this case, we fully characterize C 0 . Then, we extend the obtained result to the general model with side information at Eve.
A. Capacity Region with No Side Information at Eve
For auxiliary RVs S 1 , S 2 and T 2 satisfying Markov chain conditions 
Proof: The proof contains two parts: converse and achievability. In the converse proof presented in Appendix B-A, we show that C 0 defined by (9) is an outer bound. In the achievability part, we show that for any given
is achievable, and hence the region specified in (9) is achievable. A detailed proof of the achievability part is provided in Appendix B-B. Here, we provide a high level idea of how the achievability scheme works. As illustrated in Fig. 2 , the codebook construction is a combination of source coding techniques and channel coding techniques. We first generate S N 1 sequences according to P S 1 . Then, we generate T n 2 sequences according to P T 2 and for each generated sequence T n 2 , we generate S n 2 sequences according to P S 2 |T 2 . From Alice and Carol's perspective, the noisy channel P Y |X acts as a noiseless channel with rate I (T 2 ; Y ). This guarantees that, if messages sent by Alice have a rate less than I (T 2 ; Y ), they can be correctly decoded with high probability by Carol using Y n . As a result, the key generation model between Alice, Carol and Eve can be viewed as a source model (with no side information at Eve) using one way public discussion with rate constraint, and the rate 1 β I (S 1 ; V ) − is achievable using techniques for this model. In particular, to generate K 1 , we generate 2 N(I (S 1 ;U )+ ) sequences S N 1 , and randomly assign them into 2 N(I (S 1 ;U )−I (S 1 ;V )+2 ) bins (we choose the number of bins to guarantee that its rate is less than I (T 2 ; Y )). Alice then sends the bin index to Carol through Bob. With this bin index along with its source observation V N , Carol will be able to decode S N 1 . We will obtain a key at the rate of Note that the role of T n 2 is to convey the message received from Alice, i.e., the bin index of S N 1 , to Carol. Since Eve has access to the public channel between Alice and Bob, it is not necessary to keep T n 2 secure from Eve. That is why we have only one term β I (T 2 ; Y ) on the right-hand side of (8).
B. Capacity Region with Side Information at Eve
In this subsection, we show that the result of Section III-A can be generalized to the case in which Eve has access to side information, i.e., W = ∅. Under this model, we fully characterize the corresponding secret-key capacity region as well.
For auxiliary RVs S 1 , S 2 , T 1 and T 2 satisfying Markov chain conditions
Then, we have the following result. Corollary 1: In the joint source-channel model with side information at Eve, the secret-key capacity region is
Proof: Similar to the proof of Theorem 1, this proof also contains two parts: converse and achievability. The converse proof is provided in Appendix D.
In the following, for the achievability, we outline the encoding/decoding and key generation process while omitting detailed analyses of key rates, error and information leakage as these follow similar lines as those in the proof of Theorem 1.
It suffices to show that the pair (R 1 , R 2 ) with
is achievable.
Codebook Construction: C A at Alice. Given P T 1 , randomly and independently generate 2 N R 10 sequences T N 1 according to Here, we set Key Generation: Alice sets
Finally, following arguments similar to those used in the proof of Theorem 1, we can conclude that there exists at least one scheme such that (R 1 , R 2 ) specified in (14) and (15) is achievable, and hence R(
C. Discussion
In this subsection, we discuss the implications of the results developed in this paper. Unless stated otherwise, we focus on the case with no side information at Eve, since the case with side information at Eve follows in a similar manner.
According to Theorem 1, the following rate is achievable for K 1 :
Due to the Markov chain condition T 2 → X → Y , we have that (17) is contained in the set
which is achievable by setting T 2 = X. Hence, we can conclude via maximizing (18) that the secret-key capacity of K 1 for the case with no side information at Eve is
Equation (19) shows that if one cares only about the key K 1 , the channel between Alice and Carol can be viewed as a noiseless channel with rate constraint R = max P X β I (X; Y ) and our problem is equivalent to the problem of generating a single key with one-way public discussion subject to a rate constraint as studied in [10 
We would like to emphasize that, in general, the secret-key capacity with side information at Eve under multiple rounds of public discussion is still unknown [12] . The reason why we are able to characterize the key capacity of K 1 in our model is that, even though we allow multiple rounds of discussion over the public noiseless channel, the public discussion is between Alice and Bob, not between Alice and Carol.
In our model, Carol is connected to this noiseless channel via a wiretap channel, which is a one-way link. Since Bob observes no randomness correlated with (U, V, W ), compared with the case of one-way discussion between Alice and Bob the multiple rounds of discussion between Alice and Bob do not increase the key rate between Alice and Carol. Thus, the link between Alice and Carol can be viewed as a one-way channel with rate constraint.
Furthermore, we have that the secret-key capacity of K 2 for the case with no side information at Eve is
which can simply be derived from Theorem 1: in which the equality in (a) can be obtained by setting T 2 to be a constant. Equation (21) shows that if one cares only about K 2 , the key capacity is the same as the capacity of a discrete memoryless wiretap channel. This implies that the correlated sources (U N , V N ) do not help in increasing R 2 , as we require K 2 to be secure from Alice.
Finally, from Theorem 1 we can easily obtain that the sum capacity of (K 1 , K 2 ) for the case with no side information at Eve is
The plot of C 0 is shown in Fig. 3 , where C 0 = R 1 R 2 R 3 . R 1 is the region where there exists a P T *
such that β I (T
One does not need to sacrifice R 1 in order to obtain a larger R 2 at least when R 2 ≤ max
vanishes if T 2 is a constant). And in R 3 , one does not need to sacrifice R 2 in order to obtain a larger R 1 . Obviously, in R 2 , there exists a tradeoff between R 1 and R 2 , and C sum is obtained in this region. Note that our model is related to the setup in [17] , especially when one cares only about C sum . The major difference is that we consider an achievable rate region while [17] equivalently focuses only on the sum capacity. In addition, in our model Alice and Bob are connected by a noiseless channel while the setup in [17] can be viewed as the situation in which Alice and Bob are combined into one terminal. Furthermore, we require that K 1 is concealed from Bob and K 2 is concealed from Alice while these requirements do not exist in [17] .
IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS
We have introduced the problem of simultaneously generating multiple secret keys under a cascade model of a noiseless channel and a wiretap channel, using joint correlated sources and channels, to gain some understanding of key generation models with limited access to the public discussion channel. We have fully characterized the secret-key capacity region of the corresponding generated keys under the case in which Eve has no side information, and generalized the result to the more general case in which Eve has side information.
Input and outputs of the wiretap channel N, n Source length, number of channel uses
Auxiliary RVs:
Sub-bin indices
APPENDIX B PROOF OF THEOREM 1

A. Converse
Here, we provide the converse proof of Theorem 1. Before going further, we first introduce a lemma from [12] , which will be used frequently in the following.
Lemma 1 ([12, Lemma 4.1]): For arbitrary RVs U and V and sequences of RVs Y n and Z n we have
(24) Converse of Theorem 1: In this part, we will show that any achievable pair (R 1 , R 2 ) must be in the union defined by the right hand side of (9) .
According to the setup, the following Markov relationships hold:
Let > 0 be arbitrary; we have
in which
, and Q is an independent RV uniformly distributed over [1 : N] .
Thus, we have
Furthermore, S 1 → U → V holds as
in which (a) follows from the fact that Y n can be seen as a function of (F, θ) (θ is some RV which is independent with all other variables in (29)). Now, we prove (7). We have
Here,
, and J is an independent RV uniformly distributed over [1 : n] . (a) is true due to
Hence, we have
Furthermore, we can easily show that
. Now, to prove (8), we first have
On the other hand, we have
Combining (33) and (34), we have
B. Achievability
In this part, we will show that R(P S 1 |U , P T 2 S 2 P X |S 2 ) is an achievable region. It suffices to show that there exists at least one scheme such that the pair (R 1 , R 2 ) with
is achievable. Without loss of generality, we assume Y ) ), randomly and independently generate 2 N R 0 sequences S N 1 according to
C B at Bob. Given P T 2 S 2 P X |S 2 P Y Z|X randomly and independently generate 2 n R 11 sequences T n 2 according to
These sequences are indexed by ( f, ϕ) with ϕ ∈ [1 :
For each T n 2 ( f, ϕ), randomly and independently generate 2 n R 13 sequences S n 2 which are indexed by (γ , ψ) with γ ∈ [1 : 2 n R 14 ] and ψ ∈ [1 : 2 n R 15 ], according to
Encoding: After observing sequence U N , Alice selects a sequence S N 1 that is jointly P S 1 U typical with U N in C A . If there are more than one of such S N 1 s, she randomly select one. If there is no such sequence, she randomly selects one from the whole codebook. We denote the selected sequence by S N 1 ( f, φ). Alice sends the index f to Bob. Upon receiving f , Bob refers to C B , randomly generates a value for ϕ, and then looks into the sequences S n 2 generated by T n 2 ( f, ϕ), randomly selects one S n 2 (γ , ψ), and finally transmits it to Carol via the channel P X |S 2 P Y Z|X .
Decoding: Upon receiving sequence Y n , Carol first tries to find a unique T n 2 (f ,φ) that is jointly typical with Y n in C B . If there are more than one of such sequences T n 2 , she randomly selects one. If there exists no such sequence, she declares an error. Then Carol looks into those S n 2 s generated by T n 2 (f ,φ), trying to find a unique S n 2 (γ ,ψ) that is jointly typical with (T 
Error Analysis: Denote
Then, we have
in which (a) is true since ξ 2 and ξ 3 are independent given ξ c 1 according to the above encoding approach. In the following, we bound each term in (51) one by one.
In our scheme, each T n 2 is randomly and independently generated according to
) and the total number of T n 2 sequences is 2 n R 11 . Furthermore, Y n is equivalently generated by T n 2 ( f, ϕ) according to
Hence, it is easy to show that with high probability, (T n 2 ( f, ϕ), Y n ) is jointly typical and there will be no other T n 2 sequences that are jointly typical with Y n (one may refer to [24, Ch. 7] ). Thus,
when n is sufficiently large.
Given ξ c 1 , which is equivalent to T n 2 ( f, ϕ) being given, there are 2 n R 13 sequences S n 2 , each randomly and independently generated by T n 2 ( f, ϕ) according to
We can show that with high probability, T n 2 ( f, ϕ), S n 2 (γ , ψ) and Y n are jointly typical and there will be no other sequences S n 2 that are jointly typical with Y n according to the Packing Lemma [25] . Thus, we can conclude
Since there are 2 N R 0 sequences S N 1 , which are randomly and independently generated according to
show that with high probability there exists at least one S N 1 that is jointly typical with U N (also jointly typical with V N since S 1 → U → V ). Besides, given T n 2 ( f, ϕ), which means that f is given, there are a total of 2 N R 02 sequences S N 1 ( f, ·). Thus, with high probability there will be no other sequences S N 1 that are jointly typical with V N . Then, we have Pr{ξ 2 |ξ c 1 } ≤ /3, when N is sufficiently large.
Hence,
Information Leakage Analysis: Since φ and f are independent, and φ → f → Z n , we have
in which (a) is true due to
Finally, using standard information theoretic arguments, we can conclude that there exists a particular code such that (36) is achievable and hence R(P S 1 |U , P T 2 S 2 P X |S 2 ) is an achievable region.
APPENDIX C PROOF OF LEMMA 2
The proof here follows similar steps as those in the proof of [25, Lemma 22.3] .
Given T n 2 , denote by T n (S 2 Z |T n 2 ) the set of pairs (S n 2 , Z n ) that are jointly typical with T n 2 . Define
. Then, according to the Law of Large Numbers, we have 
Furthermore, similar to (29), we can show that
The derivation of R 2 is exactly the same as in (32); thus, we have
where S Next, we show (12) . From (34), we conclude
Now, since
and
we have
Thus, it follows that
On the other hand, as in (33), we conclude 
Combining the fact that in each term is an arbitrarily small number, we can conclude that there exists (P S 1 |U P T 1 |S 1 , P T 2 S 2 P X |S 2 ) such that (R 1 , R 2 ) ∈ R(P S 1 |U P T 1 |S 1 , P T 2 S 2 P X |S 2 ).
